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Abstract
The two main frameworks for the college admissions have been proposed so
far; one is centralized, like in Turkey, Greece, China and Iran, and the other is
decentralized, like in most of the European countries.
In centralized systems, there are clearing houses and those o¢ ces execute
the placements according to an algorithm. In decentralized markets, the agents
match with the agents on the other side themselves.
As Balinski and Sönmez (1999) showed that the algorithm used in Turkey is
equivalent to well known Gale and Shapleys stable mechanism. But, because
of the restrictions on the market, the outcome matching is unstable.
This dissertation started with the purpose to reduce the ine¢ ciencies of
the college admission procedure in Turkey. For this purpose, we propose a
mechanism to Turkish college admisson problem. We also introduce a new
market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. A semi-centralized
market is the one where the market for one side is centralized, but decentralized
for the other. The centralized side, as we call the Restricters, are only supposed
to submit their preference orderings before the game starts. Once they submit,
their job is done. Then, the other side, as we call the Choosers, play the game.
In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the
rst examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mecha-
nisms.
In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is
in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the ine¢ ciencies of
the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference
prole. It is easy to show that for some prole the mechanism generates a stable
matching.
On the other hand, when we introduce the complete information to the
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model, that is the preference prole is publicly known, we get fruitful results.
Our mechanism becomes a contribution to the implementation literature. We
show that the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given
prole.
We show this result by dividing the full domain of the proles into two;
in one partition, the proles have one single stable matching and in the other
one they have more than one matching. We detect the existence of, as we call,
Cyclical Conicts between the chooser agents for some restricters because of the
priority conicts. We observe that those cyclical conicts are the reason of such
a division. While no chooser experince any cyclical conict in the proles from
the rst division, in the second partition of the domain in all proles choosers
have such conicts. We prove our main result by using those cyclical conicts.
Depending on the actions of the choosers in those cycles, the game ends up with
one of the stable matchings.
In chapter 3, we rene our basic mechanism. The modication on the mech-
anism has a crucial e¤ect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call,
a middle mechanism. It is middle, because it partitions the full domain into
two. In one of the partitions, this mechanism coincides with the original basic
mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and
Shapleys algorithm. That is, for some proles, it again implements the full
set of stable matchings. But, for the rest of the proles, it ends up with the
chooser-optimal stable matchings.
In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Prob-
lem. We test the success of our mechanism in nding stable matchings of the
problem. It is known that there are proles for this problem where there is no
stable solution. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, rstly
we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided
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game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework.
We benet from a well known scoring rule, the Borda Rule, in a social welfare
function form. First we nd the Borda scores of each agent and generate a
social preference of those agents. The weak Borda ranking order gives us the
Restricters order in every stage of the game. Starting from the top, we start
the game with one of the top agents being the restricter of our game and the
rest of the agents take place in the chooser side. At the end of the rst stage,
matched agents are deleted from the prole and also from the social preference
ranking. Then, we continue with the next top agent among the remaining ones.
We show that this process is mostly succesful in nding a stable matching.
Then, we detect the reason why it fails to nd any stable matching for some
prole in the existence of stability. The reason is the "aggregation fault". As
we call the irrelevant alternatives may change the real ordering of some other
alternatives. When we "purify" the e¤ects of those externalities, the mechanism
becomes successful also in those proles. So, the basic mechanism successfully
nds a stable matching in the existence of stability.
We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a prole lacks
of stability by using puried orderings. Finally, we show a method to nd all
the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to
run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.
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1 The Literature Review
Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce a brief summary of the history of Matching
Theory with its most general and milestone papers. Then, we introduce some of
the most important properties of the (stable) matchings. And, nally we present
some of the well known mechanisms (which are relevant to this dissertation) in
Matching Theory.
1.1 The History and the Background of the Theory
The oldest issue known in Matching theory literature is American hospital-
intern market at mid-twentieth century. For the new medical school graduates,
the name of the specic position in the hospitals is called a residency. These
positions were an important part of the labor force of the hospitals and also the
crucial jobs for the new graduates for their future career.
Between 1900-1945, this market experienced a lot of problems. Given the
importance of the market, there was a tough competition for the candidates
between the hospitals. To hire the best candidates, the hospitals made the o¤ers
two years before the medical shool studentsgraduation. This was ridicuolus
since at the time being, the quality of the candidate could not be observed in a
clear way. Another problem was that once a residency program made an o¤er,
they put a very short period of time to respond. This decentralized market
su¤ered much from thickness.
In 1945, to stop these ine¢ ciencies, the medical shools agreed not to an-
nounce any information about their students before a specic date. This deci-
sion took the control of the time problem of the market. But, another problem
appeared. Since, this time, the agreements had to be achieved in a short time,
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the hospitals o¤ered very high salaries with a very short time to respond for the
candidates. This led to the congestion problem.
In 1952, the hospitals, the students and the medical schools agreed to cen-
tralize the placement procedure for this malfunctioning market. And, they
decided to found a central clearinghouse to coordinate the market. First, the
students applied to the residency programs of the hospitals. Then, the hospitals
conducted interviews with the students whom had applied to them. After the
interviews, both sides were ruqired to submit a preference ordering over the
other side to this clearinghouse. That is each agent submited a list of hospitals
in a rank order and also each residency program had a preference ordering over
the students that they had interviewed. And, then the clearinghouse processed
those preference orderings through an "algorithm" that they developed and
placed the candidates to the hospitals. Today, this clearinghouse is called the
National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). This process produced a "sta-
ble" placement whose meaning will be explained in this chapter soon.
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley published a paper, which is regarded
as the seminal work of Matching Theory. In their paper, they describe two
di¤erent problems; one is the college admission problem and the other is the
marriage problem.
In the marriage problem, there are two sides, namely the men and the
women. Each woman has a preference ordering over men and each man has
a preference ordering over women. The problem is to generate the "marriages"
between these two sides. Basically, we form the couples which consists of one
member from both sides. For this reason, the marriage problem is called a one-
to-one problem. That is each agent on boths sides form a couple with only one
agent of the other side.
In the college admission problem, again there are two sides; the colleges and
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the students. Each student has a preference ordeing over the colleges and each
college has rank ordering over the students. The problem here is to place the
students to the colleges in a way that each student is placed in only one college
but, each college accept many students. So, the college admission problem is
known as a many-to-one or one-to-many problem.
Gale and Shapley showed that the college admission problem is a very simple
extension of the marriage problem. The reason is that we can regard the each
seat of a school as a school with one seat. By this argument, the seats from
the same schools have the same preference orderings over the students. And,
so, the students are indi¤erent between the seats of the same school. Then,
the college admission problem becomes a one-to-one problem. Therefore, Gale
and Shapley modeled their paper on a one-to-one scenario which gives the same
results with any other game based on a many-to-many scenario.
They set up the model as the following. The collection of the preference
orderings of all agents is called a preference prole. The set of the married
couples is called a matching, . The full domain for a marriage problem consist
of all the possible combinations of the couples.
As an example, if there are three women Elena, Maria and Silvia, and three
men Matteo, Andrea and Mario, then the set of following marriages is a match-
ing: "Elena and Andrea", "Maria and Matteo" and "Silvia and Mario". Since
there are three members on both sides, the full domain consist of six matchings.
In a matching, if there exist a man and a woman, who are not married to
each other, but who prefer each other to their own mate in the matching, then
this couple is called a blocking pair. For a preference prole and a mathcing, if
there exists a blocking pair, then this matching is called unstable. Otherwise, it
is stable.
Gale and Shapley rstly proved that every marriage problem (every prefer-
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ence prole) has at least one stable matching (solution). This result is called the
stability theorem. Secondly they showed that for both of the sides as a whole
group, there exist a best-optimal matching for every preference prole. So, every
marriage problem, there exist a women-optimal, W , and a men-optimal, M ,
matching. (In section 1:2 we will describe what men and women optimal match-
ings mean). And, nally, they proposed an "algorithm" to nd those optimal
matchings.
In 1984, Alvin Roth showed that the algortihms used by NRMP and Gale-
Shaple are the same. We will describe the algorithm in a detailed way in section
1:3.
1.2 The Properties and the Structure of the Matchings
We know from Gale and Shapley that every marriage problem has a stable
solution. What about the upper limit? Do we have a function to determine
the number of stable matchings for a given preference prole? Such questions
were rstly raised by Donald Knuth in 1976 during his lectures in University
of Montréal. This is one of his famous 12 questions he asked in those lecture
series.
The answer to question was given by Irving and Leather in 1986 by using the
algorithm proposed by McVitie and Wilson (1971) who proposed the algorithm
to generate all of the stable matchings for a given prole. Irving and Leather
showed that the number of the stable matchings is an exponential function of
the number of the agents on both sides.
So, we know that preference proles, depending on the prole and the num-
ber of agents, may have many stable matchings. What about the comparisons
of the matchings in view of the agents and the sides as a group?
Let us back to above example. If Matteo prefers Silvia over Maria, then he
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prefers the matchings where he is matched to Silvia over the matchings in which
his mate is Maria. Hence, a matching is men-optimal, M , if for any man this
matching is at least as good as any other stable matching. The same argument
works for the women side.
Knuth (1976) showed that when all agents have strict preferences, the com-
mon preferences of the two sides of the market are opposed on the set of stable
matchings. That is let i and j be two stable matchings, then all men pre-
fer i over j if and only if all women prefer j over i. This also with the
result of Gale and Shapley shows that for a given prole if there is only one
stable matching, that matching is men and women optimal at the same time. If
there two stable matchings, one of them is men-optimal and the other is women
optimal; and all men prefer men-optimal matching to women-optimal one and
vise versa for women side. If there are three stable matchings, then we have
a strict ordering for both sides. For the men side, there is the men-optimal
stable matching, then the middle stable matching and women-optimal one. The
preference ordering of the women side over these three stable matchings is the
opposite of the one by the men side by Knuth. But, what if there are more than
three stable matchings for a given prole?
In 1988, Charles Blair showed that the set of stable matchings for a given
prole is a partial order for both of the sides, for sure in an opposite way. A
partial order is a set with a maximum and a minimum member, but not every
subset of it has a maximum and a minimum member. So, for any of the sides,
there is a best and a worst member of the set, but the not all the middle members
are perfectly comparable. We give more details about the "incomparable" stable
matchings in Theorem 11 and Example 12 in section 2:3:1.
The last property we want to give is Pareto E¢ cieny. For any side, men or
women, a matching  is Pareto E¢ cient if we cannot improve the mate of an
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agent without damaging to any other agent on the same side.
1.3 The Mechanisms in Matching Theory
In this section, we present some well known mechanisms in Matching Theory.
Since, as we have showed, many-to-many is a simple extension of one-to-one,
we stick to the marriage problem scenario.
1.3.1 Gale and Shapleys Algorithm
As we have stated before, the oldest issue known in Matching Theory is the
case of American hospital-intern market. Eventhough it was them who used
"the algorithm" for the rst time, it is known as Gale and Shapleys algorithm
(1962). Here how it works;
We assign one side as the proposer side. Let us assume men are the pro-
posers. In the rst stage, each man proposes simultaneously to their rst best
woman. At that moment, there three types of woman:
i) Some women do not receive any proposal,
ii) Some woman receive one proposal,
iii)Some women receive more than one proposal.
A rst type of woman moves to the second stage as being single. A second
type of woman engages tentatively to the man who has proposed. A third type of
woman picks the best man among all proposers, engages tentatively to him and
rejects the rest of the proposers.
So, at the end of the rst stage, there are two types of man:
i) Some men tentatively engage,
ii) Some men are rejected and they move the second stage as being single.
In the second stage, engaged men do not do anything. The rejected, and so
single men propose to their second best women. The same scenario in stage one
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works here. But, if an engaged woman receives one or more proposals in this
stage, then
i) If there is a better man among the new proposers than her tentative hus-
band, she picks this new man and rejects the rest including her tentative husband,
ii) If there is no proposer is better her current husband, she rejects all the
new proposers and moves to the next stage with her current husband.
......................................
In stage k, previously rejected men propose to their next best women. A
woman always picks the best man and rejects the rest. The process stops at the
end of a stage where no man is rejected. And, the currents couples are accepted
as the nal couples.
Gale and Shapley showed that this process ends in a nite stage. They
showed that as the stages pass through, men get weakly worse o¤ and women
get weakly better o¤. Gale and Shapley proved that their algorithm always nds
the proposer-optimal stable matching; that is if the men side is the proposer
side, then the outcome of the process is the men-optimal stable matching, M .
1.3.2 Multi-Category Serial Dictatorship Algorithm
This algorithm was stated in Balinski and Sönmez (1999). The algorithm de-
scribed in this paper is used by the central clearinghouse for the college admis-
sion procedure in Turkey. Here is the algorithm:
We assign one side as the non-strategic side (the objects), and the other
as the strategic side. The objects do not do anything in the game other than
submitting their preferences. Let us assume that men are the objects.
In the rst stage of the game, independently, we assign each man to their
best women. It is possible that more than one man is assigned to the same
woman, if she is a favorite woman among the men. If there exist a woman who
has more than one man, then we modify her preference ordering in a special
14
way. Among the men she is engaged, we nd the best man in view of this
woman. Then, we delete all the other men less prefered from him in view of
the woman from her preference ordering. We apply the same process to the
preference orderings of women who are engaged to more than one man. Each
time we modify a preference ordering of a woman, we also delete this woman
from the preference orderings of those men. Then, at the end of the rst stage,
we get a new tentative preference prole.
In the second stage, we assign men to women by the same argument and if a
woman has more than man, then we nd the best man engaged in her ordering
and we delete less prefered men.
.................................................
In stage k, we apply the process. This procedure stops at the end of a stage
where no woman is engagaed to more than one man. Then, these couples are
accepted as the nal couples.
Balinkski and Sönmez showed that this process always nds the objects-
optimal stable matching. That is if men are the non-strategic players (the
objects), then the outcome of the process is the men-optimal stable matching,
M .
1.3.3 Gales Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm
This algorithm was described in Shapley and Scarf (1974). Here is the algorithm;
We assign one side as "the essential" of the game. Let us assume that
essentials are women.
In the rst stage, each agent points to their most favorite agent in their
preference orderings. In the paper it isproved that there exist at least one cycle
if we draw the map. For example, a cycle may consist of 2 or more agents.
A 2-agent cycle looks like mi  ! wj  ! mi. And, a 4-agent cycle looks like
mi  ! wj  ! mj  ! wi  ! mi. In each cycle, we give the agents that the
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essentials point out. As an example, since we assign women as the essentials,
we form the pairs (wj ;mj) and (wi;mi) from above cycle. Then, we delete these
four agents from the preference prole.
..................................
In stage k, each agent points to their most favorite agent in their preference
orderings. We assign the agents that the essentials point out in the cycles. This
process stops when either one or no agent remains in the preference prole.
This pocess nds Pareto e¢ cient matching for the essential side. That is
if women are assigned as the essentials, we end with women-Pareto Optimal
matching.
This algorithm was proposed as a trade-o¤ with Gale and Shapleys algo-
rithm (1962) by Abdülkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003). Abdülkadiro¼glu and Sön-
mez claims that if the policy-maker cares about stability, Gale and Shapleys
algorithm should be used. But, if Pareto e¢ ciency is the desired property, then
Gales TTC should be applied.
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2 ANewDynamicMechanism to the Two-Sided
Matching Games
Abstract
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching
Game has a stable matching. It is also well-known that the number of stable
matchings increases with the number of agents on both sides. On the other
hand, Gale and Shapleys algorithm selects only the best matchings for either
side.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism to the semi-centralized two-sided
matching games. The mechanism ends up with any of the stable matchings for
a given prole. Formally, the set of the possible outcomes of the process is the
set of the stable matchings for any prole.
2.1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962) described the well-known marriage problem. There
is a set of men and a set of women, and each man and woman has a strict pref-
erence ordering over the agents of the other set. A set of preference orderings,
one for each agent, is called a preference prole.
We get couples each of which consists of one man and one woman from those
sets. We call the set of couples a matching. For a given prole, a matching is
unstable if there exist a man and a woman who are not paired in that matching,
but both of them prefer each other to their current mates. The matching is called
unstable, because this man and woman do not want to stay in this matching
but want to move to another one where they are together. We call such a pair of
man and woman a blocking pair. For a preference prole and a matching, if there
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is no blocking pair, then we call such a matching as stable. Gale and Shapley
showed that there is always a stable matching for every marriage problem.
They also showed that every preference prole, there exist optimal stable
matchings for both sides of the market and they distinguish their process to
nd each of them. We refer to their paper for more details.
One of the famous applications of the two-sided matching games is the college
admission problem. This paper mimics the Turkish college admission procedure.
In Turkey, student placements are centralized by a public o¢ ce. Every year
through April-June, high school graduates take several nation-wide exams in all
subjects of the high school curriculums. The scores together with their GPAs
from their high schools, students get an overall score and so thet are ranked
accordingly. Each student, knowing their rank, submits a list of schools to this
o¢ ce and placements are conducted according to an algorithm by processing
studentsschool lists and rankings.
Balinski and Sönmez (1999) showed that the algorithm used by the central
college admission authority in Turkey is equivalent to College-Proposing Gale-
Shapley algorithm (1962), which had been theoretically known as stable. But, in
their paper, they claimed that the algorithm should be converted into Student-
Proposing Gale-Shapley for the sake of the students.
Do¼gan and Yuret (2010) showed that Turkish placement procedure has some
ine¢ ciencies. Using the data of a xed year, they showed that the outcome
matching of the placements was not stable and they emprically tried to estimate
the ratio of the blocking pairs. They said that the algorithm is equivalent to the
one by Gale and Shapley, but since there are restrictions in the application of
the algortihm, e.g. in the number of schools allowed to submit and incomplete
information between the students, the procedure generates blocking pairs. They
claimed that limit for the number of schools should be increased to overcome
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this problem.
Given that the number of agents is too high, the restrictions of the school lists
by the central o¢ ce is justiable. Every year nearly two million students take
those exams and hundreds of thousands of them are assigned to the universities
(the school seats).
This paper started with the aim to decrease, and eliminate if possible, the
ine¢ ciencies of this huge market in Turkey. As we have said, the model of the
paper is based on the Turkish student placement procedure. We regard the
structure of the market as given; that is rstly the schools announce their rank-
ings, and then the students submit their school choices and matching process
starts.
Therefore, we proposed a new mechanism for this market. The market is
based on the incomplete information (that is the preference prole is not publicly
known), so was the mechanism. Eventhough we do not give precise proofs or
examples, it is easy to show that this mechanism is successful in reducing the
number of blocking pairs, depending on the preference prole.
Introducing the complete information to the model converted the game into
an "implementation problem".1
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching
Game has a stable matching. The question about the number of stable match-
ings for any prole was raised by Knuth (1976). Irving and Leather (1986)
showed that the number of stable matchings is an exponential function of the
number of agents.
McVitie and Wilson (1971) described an algorithm to generate all stable
matchings starting from either men or women optimal matching found by the
algortihm of Gale and Shapley. In section 1.4, we will give a literature review
1 I would like to thank Vincenzo Denicolò for the suggestion to introduce complete infor-
mation to the model. His advice has brought this project up to this point.
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on the papers published on implementing stable matchings.
We will show that the mechanism we propose in this paper implements the
full set of stable matchings for any prole. We propose this mechanism in, as
we prefer to say, a semi-centralized market. While for the one side the market is
centralized, i.e. the student side, for the other side it is decentralized. The agents
on the decentralized part are "the objects" and they are not active players. On
the other hand, the agents, who are having a centralized game, are the strategic
players and so they play the game.
2.2 Basic Denitions and Notations
Let M = fm1; :::;mkg and W = fw1; :::; wlg be two non-empty, nite and
disjoint sets of men and women.
Each agent has a strict preference ordering R over the agents of the other set;
that is Rmi2M be the preference ordering of mi over W . For any wi; wj 2 W ,
wiRmiwj means mi prefers wi over wj . A Preference Prole R = (Ri)i2M[W
is the a set of preferences of all agents in the model. RW[M is the set of all
preference proles for the sets M and W .
rw(m) is the rank of agent m in preference of agent w. That is, rw(m) = k
means m is the kth best man of w.
A (two-sided) matching  :M[W !M[W is an injection. For anym 2M
and w 2 W , (m) = w means w is the match of m and vice versa. (m) = m
means m is single in the matching . M[W is the set of all matchings between
M and W .
Let i; j 2 M[W be two matchings and m 2M . If i(m)Rmj(m), then
we say that for agent m, i Pareto Dominates j : If i(m) = j(m), then m is
indi¤erent between i and j and we denote this by iImj . If @mi 2M such
that j(mi)Rmii(mi) and 9mj 2M such that i(mj)Rmjj(mj), then we say
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that for the set of menM , i Pareto Dominates j ; that is iRMj . If 9mi 2M
such that j(mi)Rmii(mi) and 9mj 2 M such that i(mj)Rmjj(mj), then
we say that for the set of men M , i and j are incomparable.
For any m 2 M and w 2 W , (m;w) =2  is called a blocking pair for the
matching , if wRm(m) and mRw(w). If there is no blocking pair for , then
we say  is stable; otherwise, it is unstable.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that for any two-sided matching game R =
(Ri)i2M[W , there exists a matching  2 M[W which is stable for R.
A Matching Mechanism  is a procedure to select a matching from every
preference prole. Formally
 : RW[M  ! M[W .
A Matching Mechanism  is called stable, if it always selects a stable match-
ing.
Now, let us consider the following example.
Example 1 Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1; w2; w3g be the sets of men
and women who have the following preference prole R1:
R1 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m2
w2 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w3 w3 w1 m1 m3 m3
For the setsM andW , the set of all possible matchings is M[W = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g
where
1 = f(m1; w3); (m2; w2); (m3; w1)g,
2 = f(m1; w2); (m2; w3); (m3; w1)g,
3 = f(m1; w3); (m2; w1); (m3; w2)g,
4 = f(m1; w2); (m2; w1); (m3; w3)g,
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5 = f(m1; w1); (m2; w2); (m3; w3)g,
6 = f(m1; w1); (m2; w3); (m3; w2)g.
For prole R1, the set of stable matchings is f2; 4; 5g.
If we apply Gale and Shapleys algorithm to the prole R1, we get either 2
or 5, if we assign women or men as the proposer side, respectively.
There are two major problems with the algorithm by Gale and Shapley.
Firstly it is not symetric; if women propose, there is no chance for 5 to be
chosen and vice versa for 2. Secondly, there is no possibility for 4 to be
chosen in any scenario.
In the next section, we propose a new dynamic mehanism. With that mech-
anism, any stable matching for any prole could be chosen, e.g. for R1 the set
of the possible outcomes is f2; 4; 5g.
2.3 The Dynamic Mechanism
For a given matching game R = (Ri)i2M[W , we assign one side as the Restricter,
and the other side as the Chooser. We use the preferences of the restricters as the
restrictions or the priorities on the chooser side and the choosers make decisions
with their own preferences as their turns come. In that game, the information
is complete; that is the rule of the game and the preference prole is known by
all agents. Here is how the mechanism works.
Without loss of generality, we shall assign W as the restricter and M as
the chooser. (Later we will show that the set of the outcomes does not depend
on which set is the restricter or the chooser). The preference orderings of any
woman is the priorities of the men for those women.
We start with the man/men who are the best in view of women; that is we
start with men such that fmi 2 M j9wj 2 W such that rwj (mi) = 1g. Those
men are asked to make a decision; either to say "yes" or "no" to the woman for
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who they are the best men. Some of them may be the best man for more than
one woman. In this case, such a man is asked to choose one of those women.
If a man says "yes" to a woman, then they form a pair and both of them are
deleted from the prole; if he says "no", he loses that woman/women and waits
for his turn for other women.
At any step/rank k, a man either chooses a woman to marry or refuses and
waits for another woman. In that way, we construct our pairs.
First, we shall show that this process produces a matching from any prole.
Let mi 2M be a chooser agent. At any step where he is the best man for any
woman, if mi decides to choose an agent wj 2W , mi is deleted from the prole
and he forms the pair (mi; wj): If he never chooses anybody at any step, then
he forms the pair (mi;mi): As we have said before, any chooser says "no" to
wait for his turn for a better restricter. In this model, we explicitely assume
that all the agents are acceptable for the agents on the other side, and so they
prefer being matched to some agent than being single. If he never says "yes" to
any woman, he remains single which contradicts to the rationality assumption.
We will analyze when and why a man says "no" in the following sections. If a
chooser remains single, it is only because he does not receive any o¤er. These
scenarios are the same for all mj 2 M: On the other hand, when any mj 2 M
chooses an agent wi 2 W , she is deleted from the prole, too. If wi is not
choosen by any mj (possibly because l > k and wi is not a favorite woman),
then she forms the pair (wi; wi). This happens when all of men are matched to
some women before she calls for her "best(s)". So, any agent i 2M [W could
be a member of one pair. Hence, the outcome of this procedure  is a matching
 2 M[W :
Now, we shall demostrate our mechanism with a simple example.
Example 2 Let M = fm1;m2;m3g be the restricter and W = fw1; w2; w3g be
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the chooser who have the following preference prole R2.
R2 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w2 w1 w2 m1 m3 m1
w1 w3 w3 m3 m2 m2
w3 w2 w1 m2 m1 m3
In the rst round, w1 and w2 are asked to choose; w1 for m2 and w2 for
either m1 or m3. Since rw2(m3) = 1, w2 says "yes" to m3. They construct
(m3; w2) and both of them are deleted from the prole. As the information is
complete and so w1 knows that w2 chooses m3, she says "no" to m2.
In the second round, since rw1(m1) = 1, w1 says "yes" tom1. They construct
(m1; w1) and both of them are deleted from the prole. Eventhough rw3(m1) = 1,
since the information is complete and so w3 knows that w1 chooses m1, she says
"yes" to m2 since m2Rw3m3.
Hence,using our mechanism  we get the matching 6 = f(m1; w1); (m2; w3); (m3; w2)g
which is the only stable matching for R2.
2.3.1 The Flow of the Mechanism
Our mechanism is based on the "rst-come rst-served" principle. When a
chooser agent is asked to reply an o¤er, e.g. he is the best man for some
restricter(s), he makes his decision by considering the best alternatives better
than the current restricter. If all of them have already been taken or regarded
as will be taken in the current or the next rounds (thanks to the complete
information), then he says "yes" to the o¤er. In this section, we will examine
the game scenarios that the choosers confront.
Denition 3 Let m 2 M be any chooser agent and wi; wj 2 W be any two
restricter agents. If rwi(m) > rwj (m) and wiRmwj and at the step k = rwj (m)
non of wi and wj have been taken by other choosers yet, then we say the agent
m experiences a conict between agents wi and wj.
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The denition says that for a chooser agent if the turn for a worse restricter
comes before any better one, given that non of those restricters have not been
chosen yet, then the chooser agent experiences a conict; he may not be sure
about his decision.
Denition 4 If a chooser agent m 2M does not experience any conict, then
we say m has a smooth game.
When the information is incomplete, ex. the agents cannot observe the
preseferences of any other agents, the chooser agent cannot make a precise
decision; but incompleteness is not the topic of this paper. When the preference
prole is observable, such an agent estimates what will happen in the current
and the successive steps. Hence, he has su¢ cient information to make a clear
decision during those conicts. So, under complete information, the conicts
turn into smooth games.
In this paper, we pay our attention to the special case of conicts.
Denition 5 Let fm1; :::;mrg M be a set of choosers and fw1; :::; wrg W
be a set of restricters. If we have such a case;
 m1Rw1m2, m2Rw2m3,...,mrRwrm1;
 wrRm1w1, w1Rm2w2,...,wr 1Rmrwr;
 rw1(m1) = rw2(m2) = ::: = rwr (mr) = k (for at least one side),
 Each agent of fw1; :::; wrg and fm1; :::;mrg is present at step k.
Then, we say that agents in fm1; :::;mrg experience a cyclical conict with
each other at step k.
Therefore, eventhough the preference prole is publicly known, if some group
of choosers experience a cyclical conict, they cannot have a precise decisions,
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since the actions are not observable for the current step. Hence, when a chooser
has a smooth game, the process is a squential game for that agent. On the other
hand, when he experiences a cyclical conict, it is a simultaneous game for him
(including other agents in the cycle).
Claim 6 Any chooser agent could be a member of at most one cyclical conict
at any step k.
Proof. The proof is straight forward. Let m 2 M be any chooser being a
member of more than one cyclical conict at step k. Let wi; wj 2 W be any
two restricters where rwi(m) = rwj (m) = k and each of these restricters is
from di¤erent cyclical conicts. As an assumption, all the agents have strict
preferences. So, we have either wiRmwj or wjRmwi. In any case, the agent m
does not consider the worse agent. Hence, any chooser m experiences only one
single cyclical conict at any single step.
Now, we will focus on the a¤ects of such cycles on the relationship between
any preference prole and the set of the stable matchings for that prole; ex.
the number of stable matchings for a given prole.
Theorem 7 For a given preference prole R = (Ri)i2M[W , there exists only
one single stable matching if and only if there exists no cyclical conict for the
choosers.
Proof. ((=). Suppose that we do not have any cyclical conict. We shall
assume multiple stable matchings for a preference prole and prove that this
leads to a contradiction. Then, from Gale and Shapley there exist optimum sta-
ble matchings M and W for men and women, respectively, with MRMW
and WRWM . Since the preferences are strict, then 9mk;ml 2 M and
9wi; wj 2W , such that
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1. W (wi) = mk, W (wj) = ml, M (wi) = ml, M (w
) = mk and M (wj) =
m for some w 2W , m 2M with
2. wRmkwi, wiRmlwj , mkRwiml, mlRwjm
.
In that case, we may have two scenarios:
Scenario 1: Let A = fw 2 W jwRmlwig be the set of the agents who are
better than agent wi according to agent ml. Since M (wi) = ml, either all
of w 2 A have been taken by some other m 6= ml before the round where ml
chooses wi or ml regards each w as will be taken. Hence, any w 2 A is not
achievable for ml. On the other hand, we have W (wj) = ml. In that case, the
fact wiRmlwj contradicts the rationality of agent ml; while he could choose wi,
he did not. Then this leads us to wi = wj which gives M=W = .
Scenario 2: Maintaining the assumptions on the rationality of the agents
and existence of multiple stable matchings, we have the following scenario. If
we have stable matchings M and W , using the information in 2 above, we
may have either of the followings;
1. m = mk and w = wj , that is the sets fml;mkg and fwi; wjg had a
cyclical conict so that we have such two stable matchings, or
2. m = m0 and w = w0, that is there is a bigger cycle including ml;mk; wi
and wj ; by iterative construction, there may be cycle including all the
agents.
Both of them contradicts the fact that there is no cycle. Hence, there is only
one single stable matchings.
(=)). For any prole R = (Ri)i2M[W , there exists only one stable matching
 2 M[W . And, let us assume there exists a cyclical conict between the
agents ofM 0 = fm1; :::;mrg M for the agents W 0 = fw1; :::; wrg W at step
k.
28
Since eachmi 2M 0 is in the cycle, any better restricters than the ones in the
cycle have either been taken or regarded as taken in the current or next steps.
For that reason, in the matching  we cannot have any pair such that (mi; w^)
where mi 2 M 0 and w^ =2 W 0; because (mi; wj) would block the matching ,
where wj 2 W 0. For that reason, in the matching , 8m 2 M 0 and 8w 2 W 0,
(m) 2W 0 and (w) 2M 0.
We shall assume that all the choosers say "yes" at step k. In that case, we
may have two scenarios:
Scenario 1: M 0 =M andW 0 =W . In such case, the matching  would be
stable since no pair blocks it; that is 8w 2 W 0 get better choosers in their own
cycle, so no woman admires any man in the cycle. But, in that case, another
matching 0 would be stable where no agent m 2 M 0 says "yes" at step k;
in that situation 8m 2 M 0 0(m)Rm(m). Hence, in 0 8m 2 M 0 gets their
better restricters in their own cycle, so no man admires admires any woman in
the cycle. Hence, we have two stable matching which contradicts to the single
stable matching.
Scenario 2: M 0  M and W 0  W are proper subsets. 8m 2 M=M 0 and
8w 2 W=W 0 do not confront any cycle. Hence, each of them experince either
smooth or (simple) conict games. By using the argument in Scenario 1 of
((=), we end up with a unique set of pairs for m 2M=M 0 and w 2W=W 0, and
8m 2 M=M 0 (m) 2 W=W 0 and 8w 2 W=W 0 (w) 2 M=M 0. The remaining
part is same with scenario 1.
With Theorem 7, we have showed that when there is a unique stable match-
ing for a preference prole, we do not have any cyclical conicts for the choosers,
and vice versa. And, our proof also showed that when there is a single stable
matching, our mechanism gives us that matching. As we have a two-sided im-
plication in the theorem, we get the symmetry between the sides: if one side
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has no cyclical conict, then there is a single stable matching and if so, other
side has no cyclical conict. Then, in any scenario, we get the same matching.
Now, we know that the reason for multiple stable matchings is the existence
of cyclical conicts. The following example shows that when there are multiple
stable matchings, the set of the agents on both sides having cyclical conicts
need not be the same.
Example 8 Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1; w2; w3g be the sets of men
and woman who have the following preference prole R3:
R3 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m3
w3 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 m1 m3 m2
The set of the stable matchings for R3 is f4; 5g. When W is the chooser,
the sets of agents in the cycle are fm1;m2g and fw1; w2g. On the other hand,
whenM is the chooser, the sets of agents in the cycle are fm1;m3g and fw2; w3g.
W-Chooser case M-Chooser case
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m3
w3 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 m1 m3 m2
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m3
w3 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 m1 m3 m2
We have seen that existence of a cyclical conict generates two stable match-
ing; one of them is constructed if all the choosers in the cycle say "yes" in the
rst step and the second is created if all say "no". But, we cannot conclude
that this is always the case.
Denition 9 Let M and W be the sets of choosers and restricters, respectively.
Let M1;M2 M be the set of the agents of two cycles. If M1 \M2 = ;, we say
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the cycles are independent. Otherwise, they are (sequentially) dependent
cycles.
From Claim 6, we know that the any chooser could be a member of at most
cyclical conict at a single step; but he could be a member of another cycle in
any consecutive steps. This is why we call such cycles as sequential.
Proposition 10 If there exist two dependent cycles in the prole, they generate
three stable matchings.
Proof. The proof is simple. Let M1;M2  M and W1;W2  W with M1 and
W1 be the agents of the cycle at step k andM2 andW2 be the agents of the cycle
at step l: Let us assume that for M1 if all say "yes" at step k, 1 is generates;
if nobody says "yes", 2 is generated. And, also we shall assume that for M2
if all say "yes" at step l, 3 is generates; if nobody says "yes", 4 is generated.
Let m M1 \M2 be any chooser member of the both of the cycles.
In such a case, we may have two scenarios; either k = l or k 6= l and we
examine here each one of them. The rst scenario is trivial. Let wi 2 W1 and
wj 2 W2 such that rwi(m) = k and rwj (m) = l with (wolg) k < l. If m (like
other agents in M1) says "no", they come to the consecutive step to l (here
l   k  1). If m says "yes" (like other agents in M1) at step l which is also
the consecutive step of k, 2 is generated where all the agents without cycles
construct unique couples as we have proved in Thm 7. But, at the same time, if
m says "yes" (like other agents in M2), then 3 is generated with same uniwue
couples by the same argument. Then 2 = 3.
The same argument works for the case k = l from which we end up with
1 = 3: Hence, two sequentially cycles generate three stable matchings.
From Proposition 10, the idea saying that "each cycle produces two stable
matchings" fails. We refer to the prole R1 of Example 1 above where k 6= l. For
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example, we may have four stable matchings from either two independent cycles
or three sequentially dependent cycles. Hence, unfortunately we cannot have a
relationship between the number of cycles and the number of stable matchings
for a given prole R.
We have one more property of the cyclical conicts related to the stable
matchings.
Theorem 11 There exist (independent) cyclical conicts which occur at the
same step k if and only if we have incomparable stable matchings.
Proof. (=)).LetM andW be the sets of choosers and restricters, respectively,
and let M1;M2  M and W1;W2  W with M1 and W1 be the agents of the
one of the cycles and M2 and W2 be the agents of the other cycle.
We shall focus on the scenarios of those two cycles. Let us assume that
at step k, if the agents of M1 say "yes", they construct the couples C1 and
nobody says "yes", they construct the couples C2. Same argument works for
the agents of M2 and they construct the couples C3 from "yes" at step k and
C4 from "no" at step k. Since the cycles are independent, then the couples
are di¤erent constructed by the two cyclec. Hence, the combinations of those
cycles give us four matchings: C1 [ C3 2 1, C1 [ C4 2 2, C2 [ C3 2 3 and
C2 [ C4 2 4. And, the agents out of those cycles construct the same couples
in all those matchings from the proof of Thm 7. From the denition of a cycle,
we have
1. C2RM1C1 and C4RM2C3,
2. C1RW1C2 and C3RW2C4.
Hence, from (1) we have 1RW4 and 4RM1. And, from (2), we have 2
and 3 are incomparable for both M and W .
32
((=). Let i and j be any two incomparable stable mathcings for the
prole R = (Ri)i2M[W with M be the chooser and W be the restricter. And,
let us assume we do not have any cyclical conlicts that occur at the same step
k. We may have three scenarios.
Scenario 1: We do not have any cycles. But, in that case since we have one
single stable matching and so there is nothing to compare, our theorem becomes
true.
Scenario 2: We have independent cycles that occur consecutively at di¤er-
ent steps of the game. In that case, each cycle produces two stable matchings.
From the detion of cyclical conicts, we have for the matchings k; l that
are created from a single cycle such that k from "yeses" in the rst step and
l from "yeses" in the second that kRWl and lRMk and this is the case
for all such matchings. Contradiction to the existence for incopmrable stable
matchings.
Scenario 3: We have independent cycles and/or sequentially dependent
cycles. As stated before, dependent cycles produce such common cycles which
do not e¤ect the comparison. The same argument works with the one in Scenario
2. Contradiction.
Now we shall give an example of incomparable stable matchings.
Example 12 (Roth and Sotomayor, Example 2.17, page 37). LetM = fm1;m2;m3;m4g
and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the sets of men as the chooser and woman as the
restricter who have the following preference prole R4:
R4 =
w1 w2 w3 w4 m1 m2 m3 m4cm4 cm3 fm2 fm1 w1 w2 w3 w4cm3 cm4 fm1 fm2 w2 w1 w4 w3
m2 m1 m4 m3 fw3 fw4 cw1 cw2
m1 m2 m3 m4 fw4 fw3 cw2 cw1
M[W has 24 matchings 10 of which are stable for R4. Two of them are 8 =
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f(m1; w3); (m2; w4); (m3; w2); (m4; w1)g and 9 = f(m1; w4); (m2; w3); (m3; w1); (m4; w2)g.
8 is generated if the agents of fm4;m3g and fm2;m1g say "yes" and "no",
respectively, and the opposite for 9. And, both for M and W , 8 and 9 are
incomparable.
Before we state and prove our main theorem, let us examine the following
trivial example.
Example 13 Let M = fm1;m2g and W = fw1; w2g be the sets of men as the
chooser and woman as the restricter who have the following preference prole
R5:
R5 =
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w1 m1 m2
w1 w2 m2 m1
For the sets M and W , the set of all the possible matchings between them is
M[W = f1; 2g where
1 = f(m1; w1); (m2; w2)g,
2 = f(m1; w2); (m2; w1)g.
For the prole R5, the set of the stable matchings is f1; 2g. If w2 says
"yes" to m1, then the best response of w1 would be "yes" to m2 (otherwise,
we get the couples  = f(m1; w2); (m2;m2); (w1; w1)g) and vice versa. And,
if w2 says "no" to m1, then the best response of w1 would be "no" to m2;
otherwise w1 would miss the chance to construct (w1;m1) which she prefers
over (w1;m2). Hence, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game is NE(w1; w2) =
f(yes; yes); (no; no)g. And, it is easy to show that the argument is same for any
cyclical conicts.
Theorem 14 If Nash Equilibria of the cycles are chosen, the outcome of our
mechanism is the set of the stable matchings for any preference prole. In other
words, we always end up with one of the stable matchings for any prole.
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Proof. The proof is straight forward. Let R = (Ri)i2M[W be any prole with
M be the chooser and W be the restricter. If there is no cyclical conict, then
there is only one stable matching and our mechanism nds it as we have proved
in Thm 7.
Hence, let us assume there are some cyclical conicts for that prole, and
so we have multiple stable matchings. Let M[W = f1; :::; rg be the set of
all stable matchings for R. So, let us assume 9 2 M[W , but our mechanism
does not nd it in any scenario.
From Thm 7 and Proposition 10, we know that 8i 2 M[W are generated
by some cyclical conicts. Any cycle that has n choosers and n restricters
generates n! matchings; two of them are stable and (n!   2) are unstable. The
game ends when all agents construct a pair. With NE assumption, either all the
agents in any cycle say "yes" or all say "no". As they say "no", we prooceed
from top to the bottom on the preferences of W . With the assumption on NE
solutions, we ommit (n! 2) unstable matchings for each cycle which means our
mechanism always ends up with a stable matching. So, for each cycle, one of
two stable matchings is chosen.
Hence, if there exists such a matching , then either it was not generated by
any cycle or it is an unstable matching. If  was not generated by any cycle,
then from Thm 7, it is the unique stable matching for the prole R which is a
contradiction to the existence of multiple stable matchings. If  is unstable, then
we are done. Hence, any stable matching could be chosen by our mechanism
and there is no possibility to end up with unstable matching.
2.3.2 Strategy-Proofness of the Mechanism
Now, we will investigate whether our mechanism is vulnerable to the strategic
manipulation or not.
35
Theorem 15 Truth telling is weakly dominant in our mechanism.
Proof. Let us assume that our mechanism is manipulable. Let R = (Ri)i2M[W
be any prole based on true preferences with M be the chooser and W be
the restricter. And, let R = (Ri)i2M[W be any other prole with Ri =
Ri2M[W=fmgand Rm 6= Rm for a chooser agent m 2 M . R is the prefer-
ence prole based on mispresented preferences and m is the manipulator agent
with (R)Rm(R). We may have two scenarios:
Scenario 1: For R we have one single stable matching; that is there is no
cyclical conict. So let (R) =  and 9 2 (R). Let wi; wj 2 W with
(m) = wiRmwj = (m). As we have proved, our mechanism  is stable, and
so is . To satisfy stability for , (wj)Rwjm and mRwi(wi). If we have
(w) = (w) for 8w 2 W=fwi; wjg, then we get (wj) = (wi) = m such
that the sets fm;mg and fwi; wjg construct a cyclical conict. If not, to keep
the stability of  we should have a pair (m^; wj) with m^Rwjm, and so on. In
every step, we should assign a better mate to every agents which iteratively
leads us to the full cyclical conict. This is a contradiction to fact that there is
no cyclical conict.
Scenario 2: For R we have one single cyclical conict. If m is not a member
of the cycle, then the above argument works. Let wi; wj 2 W be the agents
that m experiences the conict with wiRmwj . Let M and W be the stable
matchings from Gale and Shapley such that M = wi and W = wj . From the
denition of a cycle, any agent in the set fwjwRmwi; w 2Wg is not achievable
for m. Any matching  such that wjRm(m) would be unstable. Hence, the
question becomes "Can m guarantee to make M = wi chosen?".
Firstly, we shall examine the trvial example, ex. Example 12 above, where
2 = M and 1 = W . Letm = m1 be our manipulator. A change bym breaks
the cycle and (R) = 1 = W . Hence, m damages himself by abolishing the
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possiblity for 2 = M to be chosen.
Now, we shall consider any cycle which has three agents on each side with
9m;mi;mj 2M and wi; wj ; wk 2W such that wkRmwi, wiRmiwj and wjRmjwk.
If m changes his ordering, he breaks the cycle and saying "yes" to the o¤ers is
a dominant-rational strategy. And, we end up with W . By the same argu-
ment, iteratively for any number of agents, breaking the cycle damages to the
manipulator. The argument works for any number of cycles for the choosers.
Hence, we conclude that truth telling is weakly dominant for the choosers.
2.4 The Related Literature
In the related literature, there are papers, which have di¤erent model and pat-
tern, on implementing the stable matchings. The main di¤erence of those papers
are that some of them are modeled on the centralized market and the others
are on decentralized markets.
While in the centralized markets, there is a social planner who collects the
preferences of all agents and constructs the matching, in the decentralized ones,
the agents on both sides match with other themselves.
Among the centralized based paper in the literature, the closest one to our
paper is Alcalde (1996). Alcalde proposed a deferred acceptance algorithm
similar to Gale-Shapley, but in a now-or-never scenario, that is if an agent
receives an o¤er, she can never receive an o¤er in the subsequent stages. Alcalde
showed that in undomainated Nash equilibria, the mechanism ends up with the
full set of stable matchings.
The related papers to ours have been published for the decentralized markets.
Blum, Roth and Rothblum (1997) poposed an defer-acceptance process. They
assume there is uncertainty; each proposer only knows to who she proposes and
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each receiver-replier knows only his o¤er. Also, the order of the proposers to
make o¤ers is randomized. They analyzed the Nash equilibria. They show that
since the order of the proposers are randomized, whether the mechanism ends
up with proposer-optimal matching or not depends on the initial point of the
game.
Alcalde et al. (1998) proposed a one-stage game. In the rst stage the
o¤ers are made, and in the second the candidates-receivers accept at most one
proposal. The poposers simultaneously make the o¤er all the agents they want
on the other side. Then, then the proposals are accepted or rejected and the
game ends. They show that this implements the full set of stable matchings in
subgame perfect nash equilibrium.
Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) proposed a many-to-one sequential one-
stage mechanism similar to Gale and Shapley. In the rst stage, the students
simultaneously send a letter to at most one college and in the second stage the
colleges select the set of best students among their candidates. They show that
this mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings in subgame Nash
equilibrium.
Peleg (1997) proposed a one-stage one-to-one model for the marriage prob-
lem. The agents on both sides propose to at most one agent on the other side.
If a man and a woman propose each other, then they form a pair. Peleg showed
that his mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings by strong Nash
equilibria. He also showed that an extensive form game nds the same set in
subgame Nash equilibrium.
Roth and Xiaolin (1997) proposed a deferred acceptance algortihm for the
market for clinical psychologists. When the agents on one side of the market
make the o¤ers, the other side can hold the o¤er for a while. They show that
the results coincide with Gale-Shapley.
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Haeringer and Wooders (2011) proposed a sequential mechanism and they
studied the mechanism for four di¤erent scenarios. In their game, the rms
propose and the workers accept or reject the o¤ers. Their scenarios are based
on whether rms and workers acts simultaneously or non-simultaneously. They
show that regarless of the rms, if the workers act simultaneously the outcome
includes the full set of stable matchings, but also includes unstable ones. If they
act non-simultaneously, the result is worker-optimal stable matching.
Romero-Medina and Triossi (2013) proposed an extension of the model by
Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000). Precisely, they extended the serial dicta-
torship. The students simultaneously propose to the colleges. And, then, the
colleges in a xed ordering are allowed to accept their o¤ers in one single queue.
They show that this extended-serial dictatorship mechanism implements the full
set of stable matchings in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Among those papers, our work is based on a semi-centralized work with
a multi-stage game for one side. In this perspective, it is similar to Romero-
Medina and Triossi (2013), but we allow multi-ordering; not restricted to one
queue. There is a similarity to the paper by Haeringer and Wooders (2011)
in the sense that there are multi-stages for non-proposers. But, we x the the
preferences of one side which makes them non-strategic players, namely "objects"
in the game. Moreover, their looks like a chess game; the sides of the market
play after the other side. The game consists of multi one-stage games. But, in
our paper for one side (restricters) it is one stage game and for the other side
(choosers) it is a multi stage game and they play the game with each other; not
with the restricter agents on the other side. Since our models are di¤erent, we
observe the di¤erences in the outcomes; our mechanims never ends up with a
best stable matching for any side, unless there is only one single matching of
the game. Besides, our mechanism does not choose any unstable matching in
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subgame Nash equilibrium.
2.5 A Simple Extension of the Mechanism into Many-to-
Many Case
Our basic mechanism  is dened for one-to-one matching games. And, we
have showed that it implements the full set of stable matchings.
We can simply extent the mechanism into many-to-one games for which the
college admission problem is a well-known example. First, we should convert
the game into one-to-one. We can do this conversion by regarding each "seat" of
a school as a "school with one seat". In this way, we seperate the restricters the
schools into the seats. And, the seats of the same schools have the preference
orderings over the set of the students. Tehn, it is easy to show that our previous
results hold.
More interesting extension of one-to-one games is many-to-many games for
which many of the properties of one-to-one models do not extend. The main
reason for that is in this wider class of two-sided matching games, object com-
parison is introduced di¤erent from one-to-one games.
The usual example for this class is the match of the workers and the rms.
There are two disjoint sets of the workers and the rms and each agent has
a preference ordering over the agents of the other set. The main di¤erence of
many-to-many games from other scenarios is that any agent may have more
than one mate. That is any worker may be matched to one than one rm and
also the opposite. Formally,
Denition 16 Let W = fw1; :::; wkg and F = ff1; :::; flg be two non-empty,
nite and disjoint sets of workers and rms, with the quotas QW = fwq1; :::; wqkg
and QF = ffq1 ; :::; fql g. Each agent has a strict preference ordering R over the
agents of the other set; that is Rwi2W be the preference ordering of wi over
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F . For any wi; wj 2 W , wiRfiwj means fi prefers wi over wj. A Preference
Prole R = (Ri)i2F[W is the a set of preferences of all agents in the model.
RW[F is the set of all preference proles for the sets F and W .
Denition 17 rw(f) is the rank of agent f in preference of agent w. That is,
rw(f) = k means f is the kth best rm of w.
Denition 18 A matching  : P (F )=; ! P (W )=; is a mapping, where P (:)
is the power set. For any f 2 F and W W , (f) =W means that the set W
is the match of f . (f) = f means f is single in the matching if W = ;. .
(P (F )=;)[(P (W )=;) is the set of all matchings between (P (F )=;) and (P (W )=;).
In this many-to-many model, we study the Pairwise Stability concept. But,
"object comparison" is not the topic of this paper. So, we drop the object
comparison part from the usual denition of pairwise stability.
Denition 19 Let W and F be the sets of the workers and the rms. Let
f; f 2 F and w;w 2 W . Let  : P (F )=; ! P (W )=; be a matching. Let
w 2 (f) and f 2 (w) with fRwf and wRfw. Then, we say the matching 
is pairwise blocked by the pair (f; w). Then, we call  pairwise unstable. If
there is no pairwise blocking, then  is pairwise stable.
Then we dene our mechanism  as,
 : RW[F  ! (P (F )=;)[(P (W )=;)
We shall apply our mechanism  to this many-to-many game.
2.5.1 The Flow of the Mechanism
Without loss of generality, we shall assign the rms as the restricters and the
workers as the choosers; previously we have showed that order of the game does
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not change the result for one-to-one case and this many-to-many model is not
an execption.
If a chooser agent accepts the o¤er, both of the agents ll one of their quotas.
Any agent is deleted from the game, when he lls all of his positions.
Like in section 1:3:1, we have the concepts of a "smooth game" and a "con-
ict" for the chooser side. But, since the choosers stay in the game longer in
this model, we need to modify our denitions.
Denition 20 Let w 2 W be any chooser agent and fi; fj 2 F be any two
restricter agents. If rfi(w) > rfj (w) and fiRwfj and at the step k = rfj (w)
non of fi and fj have been deleted from the game yet, then we say the agent
w experiences a conict between agents fi and fj if the current rank of fj in
Rw, r

fj
(w), is bigger than the current quota of w, that is rfj (w) > w
q , in the
current subgame.
The denition says that for a chooser agent if the turn for a worse restricter
comes before any better one, given that non of those restricters have not been
deleted from the game yet, and if this restricter is not one of the favorite agents
for the remaining positions, then the chooser agent experiences a conict; he
may not be sure about his decision.
The above denition is the key factor of this section. Since, the choosers
may match to multi partners, we only observe conicts when the restricter of
the issue is not a top candidate for the quotas of the chooser. If the numerical
values of both of the agentsranks are less than their capacity, the agent directly
accepts the o¤er.
Denition 21 If a chooser agent w 2W does not experience any conict, then
we say w has a smooth game.
The denition of a cycle is same as the one in section 1:3:1.
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Denition 22 Let wi;wj 2 W be the chooser agents who experince conicts
on the same restricter agents fi; fj 2 F , in an opposite way. Then, we say that
the set of the choosers fwi;wjg experince a cyclical conict for the set of the
restricters ffi; fjg.
According to above set up and denitions, all the results of the section 1:3
also hold for this many-to-many game.
Theorem 23 If Nash Equilibria of the cycles are chosen, the outcome of our
mechanism is the set of the pairwise stable matchings for any preference prole.
In other words, the mechanism  implements the full set of the pariwise stable
matchings.
Proof. The proof is based on the same arguments with Theorem 14.
It is easy to show that truth telling is weakly dominant for the choosers by
Theorem 15.
2.6 The Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new dynamic mechanism for the semi-centralized
two-sided mathcing games. The model mimics the college admission procedures
where the number of agents is too high in the market, like Turkey, Greece, Iran
and China, where the admissions to the universities are centralized.
The mechanism is denedon a market where the preferences of one side
are xed (the schools) and we the other side (the students) play the game
simultaneously. Which matching to be found is determined by the actions of
the students at the decision steps.
The mechanism is an improvement under incomplete information in the sense
that it partially or fully eliminates the blocking pairs depending on the pref-
erence prole. Under complete information, it ends up with one of the stable
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matchings. Precisely, the set of the possible outcomes of the procedure is the
set of the stable matchings for a given market.
We also shoewd that a simple extension of the mechanism into many-to-
many games, generates the full set of pairwise stable matchings, where we drop
the object comparison part.
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3 A Partially Biased Mechanism for the College
Admission Problem
Abstract
Evci (2014) showed that their mechanism implements the full set of sta-
ble matchings for a semi-centralized market. In this paper, we propose a new
mechanism to the same semi-centralized two-sided matching games.
We show that the mechanism generates a bias for the strategic player; that is
our mechanism improves the outcome for the centralized side. The mechanism
partitions the full domain; for the proles in one partition, our mechanism
coincides with the mechanism by Evci (2014) and for the other partition it end
up with the algortihm by Chooser-Optimal Gale - Shapley (1962).
3.1 Introduction
The seminal work by Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that every two-sided
matching game has a stable matching, which is known as the "stability theorem".
They also proved that there exist matchings which are best for either of the side
in prole. Depending on the proposer side, their algorithm ends up with the
stable matching which is the best for the prposers.
Evci (2014) proposed a mechanims for the semi-centralized two-sided mar-
kets. They propose the concept semi-centralized to the huge markets where the
number of agents is too high. In such markets, either applying an centralized
algorithm is not e¢ cient, or it is possible with some restrictions on the proce-
dure, which brings some ine¢ ciencies as Do¼gan and Yuret (2010) have showed.
Their mechanism in this specically modied market implements the full set of
stable matchings.
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Under the same conditions, that is in a huge market where centralization is
not possible in an e¢ cient way, we propose a mechanism to improve the outcome
for the strategic players, namely for the students in college admission problem.
We show that the mechanism is partially successful in achieving this goal.
Moreover, the mechanism we propose here is in fact a renement of the one
by Evci (2014). We apply a little change to their mechanism and we improve
the result for the choosers, as they call in their paper.
Since, we rene their mechanism, we directly adopt their notation. In the
next section, we propose our renement and the analysis of the game with the
characterization the results.
3.2 The Mechanism
In this section, we propose a renement of the mechanism by Evci (2014) and
analyze the e¤ects of this little modication2 . Since they call their mechanism
, we shall use the letter  for ours.
The di¤erence of  from  is that when a chooser agent refuses the o¤er,
he is re-placed to the end of the queue of the same restricter agent instead of
loosing her forever as in . Now, we shall start with the most trivial example
to analyze the equilibrium.
Example 24 We will focus on R5 in Example 13.
R5 =
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w1 m1 m2
w1 w2 m2 m1
For the sets M and W , the set of all the possible matchings between them is
M[W = f1; 2g where
1 = f(m1; w1); (m2; w2)g,
2 = f(m1; w2); (m2; w1)g.
2 I would like to thank Giacomo Calzolari for suggesting this renement.
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For the prole R5, the matchings f1; 2g are both stable and for the mecha-
nism  the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game is NE(w1; w2) = f(yes; yes); (no; no)g.
Under the mechanism , the story changes.
First, let us assume that w1 says "no" and she is replaced to the end of the
queue of the agent m2. At the same step, if w2 says "no", then in the second
stage of the game, the tentative preference prole will look like,
R5 =
m1 m2 w1 w2
w1 w2 m1 m2
w2 w1 m2 m1
Then, in this step both of the choosers say "yes" and we end up with the
matching 1 which is chooser-optimal.
On the other hand, at the rst step if w2 says "yes", then she forms the pair
(m1; w2) and both of them are deleted from the prole. In the second stage of
the game, the tentative preference prole will look like
R5 =
m2
w1
Then, w1 forms the pair (m2; w1) and we end up with the matching 2 which
is restricter-optimal.
Secondly, let us assume that w1 says "yes", then she forms the pair (m2; w1)
and both of them are deleted from the prole. At the rst step, whatever w2
says, we end up with the matching 2.
Hence, at the rst step, if w1 says "yes", the game ends up with f2g and if
w1 says "no", the game ends up with one of f1; 2g. So, regardless of which
action w2 takes, for w1 rejecting the o¤er is weakly dominant. The arguments
are the same for w2:
Therefore, for the mechanism  the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game is
NE(w1; w2) = f(no; no)g, which ends up with 1, the chooser-optimal matching.
We have showed that for the prole R5,  is an improvement for the choosers;
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of course the case is opposite for the restricters. We continue with another
example.
Example 25 We will study R3 in Example 8.
R3 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m3
w3 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 m1 m3 m2
The set of the stable matchings for R3 is f4; 5g according to the list of the
matchings in Example 1. Here, the strategic players are w1 and w2.
The same arguments with those in Example 16 work. For both of w1 and w2,
rejecting the o¤eres at step 1 is weakly dominant. Therefore, for the mechanism
 the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game is NE(w1; w2) = f(no; no)g, which
ends up with 5, the chooser-optimal matching.
Example 25 shows that, eventhough it is not a trivial example, for R3, which
has two stable matchings,  is an improvement for the choosers.
Claim 26 From Example 24 and 25, can we conclude that for all proles with
two stable matchings (one cyclical conict),  is an improvement for the choosers?
The following example shows that the answer is negative.
Example 27 Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1; w2; w3g be the sets of men
and women who have the following preference prole R6:
R6 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w1 m2 m1 m1
w3 w1 w3 m1 m3 m2
w2 w3 w2 m3 m2 m3
For prole R6, the set of stable matchings is f3; 5g. Now, we will analyze
the possible scenarios.
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First, let us assume that w1 accepts the o¤er and w2 does not at step 1, then
we end up with 6, which w1 prefers less than 3, chooser-optimal matching.
So, if w2 rejects the o¤er, so does w1.
Second, let us assume that w1 rejects the o¤er and w2 accepts at step 1, then
we end up with 1, which w1 prefers less than 5, restricter-optimal matching.
Therefore, if w2 accepts the o¤er, so does w1.
Hence, there is no dominant strategy at step 1. We conclude that  is not
an improvement for the choosers for R6.
Next example will be on a prole with three stable matchings.
Example 28 Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1; w2; w3g be the sets of men
and women who have the following preference prole R7:
R7 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w3 m3 m1 m2
w2 w1 w2 m2 m3 m1
w3 w3 w1 m1 m2 m3
For prole R7, the set of stable matchings is f2; 4; 5g. Now, we will
analyze the possible scenarios for w1. The table below shows all possible decisions
at step 1 and corresponding mate that w1 matches from the game.
w1 Y es No Y es No Y es No Y es No
w2 Y es Y es Y es Y es No No No No
w3 Y es Y es No No Y es Y es No No
Mate m1 m1 m1 m3 m1 m2 m1 m3
So, we conclude that for w1 rejecting the o¤er at step 1 is weakly dominant.
Same analysis for w2 and w3 shows that also for those agents it is a dominant
strategy to refuse. Therefore, for the mechanism  the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
of this game is NE(w1; w2; w3) = f(no; no; no)g, which ends up with 2, the
chooser-optimal matching.
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Example 28 shows that, for R7, which has three stable matchings (inter-
dependent cycles),  is an improvement for the choosers.
Claim 29 From Example 28, can we conclude that for all proles with three sta-
ble matchings (inter-dependent cycles),  is an improvement for the choosers?
The following example shows that the answer is negative.
Example 30 We will study R1 in Example 1.
R1 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w2 w2 m3 m1 m2
w2 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w3 w3 w1 m1 m3 m3
For prole R1, the set of stable matchings is f2; 4; 5g. Now, we will
analyze the possible scenarios.
First, let us assume that w1 accepts the o¤er and w2 does not at step 1, then
we end up with 6, which w2 prefers less than 5, men-optimal matching. So,
if w1 accepts the o¤er, so does w2.
Second, let us assume that w1 rejects the o¤er and w2 accepts at step 1,
then we end up with 1, which w2 prefers less than 4 or 2 (women-optimal
matching). Hence, w2 is bounded by the action of w1 at step 1.
Finally, let us assume that both of w1 and w2 reject the o¤ers at step 1, then
we will have the following tentative prole,
R1 =
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w2 w1 w3 m3 m1 m2
w3 w3 w1 m2 m2 m1
w1 w2 w2 m1 m3 m3
For prole R1, the set of stable matchings is f2; 4g. And, it is easy to
show that at the second step of R1 for w1 and w3, rejecting the o¤ers is weakly
dominant which leads us to 2, the women-optimal matching.
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Since there is no dominant strategy at the rst step of R1, we cannot conclude
that the outcome set is f2; 5g. Even if we ended up with the set f2; 5g
by dominant strategies, we could not say that this set is better than the set
f2; 4; 5g; object comparison is not the topic of this paper.
So far we have showed that for the proles with independent or inter-
dependent cyclical conicts  may or may not be an improvement for the
choosers compared to . The bigger proles with more than three stable match-
ings (including incomparable matchings) consist of both independent and inter-
dependent cycles. Hence, the same arguments and similar examples, like above,
work also for those proles.
Proposition 31 Let M = fm1; :::;mkg be the restricter and W = fw1; :::; wlg
be the chooser side, with l > k. @R = (Ri)i2M[W 2 RW[M ,  is an improve-
ment for the choosers. In other words, 8R = (Ri)i2M[W 2 RW[M ,  and 
coincide.
Proof. The proof is straight forward. For simplicity let us assume k = n and
l = n+ 1. Let R 2 RW[M be any prole.
If R has only one stable matching, then both of  and  nds it. Hence,
they coincide.
Let us assume R has more than one stable matching. LetM[W = f1; :::; rg
be the set of all stable matchings for R. From Roth and Sotomayor (1990), we
know that for a prole R, the set of the agents that are matched is the same
for all stable matchings. Therefore, the set of n women matched to n men are
same for all  2 M[W .
Let w 2 W be the agent who remains single for all stable matchings. Let
w 2W be one the agents in stable matchings. We only need to show that there
exists a cycle where w does not have a weakly dominant strategy.
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Without loss of generalirt, let us assume 8w 2 W=fwg accept the o¤ers
in the rst cycle they confront and w rejects the o¤er by m 2 M and she is
re-placed to the end of the same queue. Since 8m 2 M=fmg have been taken
and deleted from the prole, in the next step w accepts the o¤er by m 2 M
and forms the pair (m;w). w remains single which she prefers less than being
matched to m. Hence, w is bounded by the actions of the other agents, like
in . The same argument works for any other agent that is matched in stable
matchings.
We conclude that  is not an improvement and it coincides with .
Finally, we state our most general result.
Theorem 32 Let M = fm1; :::;mkg be the restricter and W = fw1; :::; wlg be
the chooser side. Let RW[M be the set of all proles.
Let R;R;R 2 RW[M be disjoint sub-domains, that is R[R[R =
RW[M and R \ R = ;, R \ R = ;, R \ R = ;, where we have k  l
for R and R and k < l for R.
Let GSChooser denote the mechanism by Gale and Shapley where, as we call,
the chooser side propose. Then, we have
 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
GSChooser; if R 2 R
; if R 2 R
; if R 2 R
Proof. Examples 24  30 and Proposition 31 proves the theorem.
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3.3 The Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new mechanism to generate a bias for the
chooser side in semi-centralized two-sided matching game as described in Evci
(2014). We have showed that we are partially successful for this purpose; the
rened mechanism is an improvement in a subdomain.
Basically the mechanism  partitions the full domain into two. In one of
them, it coincides with GSChooser, that is it ends up with chooser-optimal stable
matching, and in the other it coincides with , that is it ends up with any of
the stable matchings. Then, for the second case we partition this sub-domain
into two as R and R.
Unfortunately, for now we cannot know further about the distinction between
R and R. This is because the improvement for the case k  l is prole based
and we do not have any extra relation for the proles within R or R.
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4 A SimpleMechanism for the Roommate Prob-
lem
Abstract
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to marriage
problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the
marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In
other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism to the roommate problem.
Firstly, the mechanism is successful in determining the reason of instability.
Hence, it detects whether any given prole has a stable matching or not. If the
prole has a stable solution, the mechanism nds that matching. We also show
how we can end up with any stable matchings in the existence of multi stability
using our mechanism.
4.1 Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962) described the well known roommate problem in
their seminal paper. In the problem, there are even number of boys and rooms
for paired boys. Each boy has a preference ordering over the other boys. The
objective is to allocate these boys to the rooms. They showed that this problem
does not hold the stability theorem and they describe a counter-example in their
paper.
Knuth (1976) showed that multiple solutions could exist, like the marriage
problem. In his 12 famous questions he raised in these lecture notes he asked
for an e¢ cient algorithm to nd a stable solution for the roommate problem.
Irving (1985) proposed a deferred acceptance algorithm for the roommate
problem. The algorithm tells whether a given prole has a stable solution or
57
not and if there exists the algorithm nds it.
In this paper, we propose a simple mechanism to this problem. We ben-
et from the mechanism proposed in Evci (2014). The problem here is that
their mechanism is for semi-centralized two-sided matching games. But, the
roommate problem is a one-sided matching game. Hence, rstly we convert
the model of the roommate problem into a semi-centralized two-sided game by
using auxiliary functions, and then we will apply the mechanism by Evci (2014)
to this modied market. And also, we give our solution to multi stability case
using our mechanism.
In the next section, we describe the roommate problem with an example.
Later, we propose our mechanism and model.
4.2 Basics and Examples
"The Roommate Problem" is one of the most interesting examples of matching
theory.3 In the game we match the agents, but there is only side.
The problem was proposed rstly by Gale and Shapley (1962). In the
roommate problem, as one-sided game, we have an even-number cardinal set of
agents. There are 2n number boys and n rooms. Each boy has a preference
ordering over the other (2n   1) boys. The objective is to allocate those boys
to n rooms in pairs.
In their paper, Gale and Shapley give a counter example which shows that
stability theorem, which holds for the marriage problem, fails for the roommate
problem. They say "...consider boys , ,  and , where  ranks  rst, 
ranks  rst,  ranks  rst, and ,  and  all rank  last. Then regarless
of s preferences...". We shall demonstrate their example with the following
preference prole R8,
3 I would like to thank Jean Lainé for the suggestion to test the mechanism for the roommate
problem.
58
R8 =
a b c d
b c a c
c a b b
d d d a
where N = fa; b; c; dg be the set of the agents and N = f1; 2; 3g be the
set of all possible matchings, where
1 = f(a; b); (c; d)g,
2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g,
3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g.
None of those matchings is stable; 1 is blocked by (b; c), 2 is blocked by
(a; b) and 3 is blocked by (a; c). So, in this one-sided game, we observe unstable
matching games as well as the stable ones.
4.3 The Mechanism and The Model
In this section we rene the mechanism  of Evci (2014) to the roommate prob-
lem. The mechanism  is designed for two-sided matching games. Therefore,
we should modify either the mechanism or the roommate problem. To stick
with the mechanism and its structure, we shall modify the game. So, we need
to convert this game into two-sided case. For this purpose, we benet from a
well-known social welfare function (SWF).
Denition 33 Let A be a set of alternatives, with Card(A) = m, and N be
a set of objects, with Card(n). 8i 2 N , Ri be the (strict) preference ordering
of i over the set of alternatives A. R be the set of all orderings and RN be a
preference prole.
A Social Welfare Function (SWF) f : RN  ! R gives the social preference
of the society N over the alternative set A.
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This is the usual denition of a social welfare function in Social Choice
Theory. Basically, we aggregate the orderings of all agents. Next, we give the
denition of a famous SWF, which is one of the Scoring Rules.
Denition 34 In a prole, the Borda Score BS(x) of an alternative x is BS(x) =P
i2N
[(m+ 1)  ri(x)]. In a voting system, the Borda Rule as a SWF, ranks the
alternatives according to their Borda Scores. We allow weak orders in social
preference.
And, this is the usual the Borda Rule denition. In the roommate problem,
since there is no alternative set, we modify the deniton of the Borda Rule to
this game. Now, we shall show this modication in an example.
Example 35 Let N = fa; b; c; d; e; fg be the set boys with a preference prole
R9,
R9 =
a b c d e f
b c d a a b
c d a b b a
d a b c c c
e e f f d d
f f e e f e
Now, we shall compute the Borda scores of the agents.
B(a) = 0 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 5 + 4 = 21
B(b) = 5 + 0 + 3 + 4 + 4 + 5 = 21
B(c) = 4 + 5 + 0 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 18
B(d) = 3 + 4 + 5 + 0 + 2 + 2 = 16
B(e) = 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1 = 7
B(f) = 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 0 = 7
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From these scores, we get the prole to be used for our mechanism,
R9 =
a b c d e f B(R)
b c d a a b ab
c d a b b a c
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
Since the mechanism in Evci (2014) is called , we shall denote ours by .
 is dened over the preference prole RN and its Borda ranking B(RN ) into
the set of matchings N . Formally,
 : (RN ; B(RN ))  ! N .
Now, we describe how our mechanism works here. We use the Borda ranking
of preference prole to split the game into two-sided case. The Borda ranking
gives the order of the agents that will be the restricter in all successive steps.
We assign the rst agent in Borda ranking as the restricter. Then, all the
other agents take place in the chooser side. If there is more than one agent
at the top, we randomly choose one of them and assign him as the restricter.
Then, we run the mechanism .
Claim 36 At the end of the rst stage, we get a pair which consists of the
restricter and one of the choosers.
Proof. The proof is easy. Since the restricter is (one of) the top agent(s) in
the Borda ranking, he is a favorite agent. If there exists a chooser agent whose
the best agent is the restricter, then trivially they form a pair.
So, let us assume that there is no agent whose the best agent is this restricter.
This is possible under the Borda rule. If all the choosers reject, then we get
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an unstable matching (in the existence of stable matchings) which is against
the rationality of the agents. Since there is only one ordering, the choosers do
not confront any conict or cyclical conict as they do in the games for , it is
easy to show that in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, since there is only one
ranking (that is serial dictatorship), there exists a chooser that accepts the o¤er
because the other better alternatives are not achievable.
Then, we delete the agents of the pair from the preference prole and the
Borda ranking. For the second stage of the game, we assign the best agent in
the Borda ranking as the restricter. Then, we run our mechanism. And, so on.
Now, we demonstrate the mechanism  with an example.
Example 37 We will study R9 in Example 35.
R9 =
a b c d e f B(R)
b c d a a b ab
c d a b b a c
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
Since there is tie between a and b, we randomly choose one of them.
Firstly, let us pick a as the restricter. Firstly, b is called to make a choice. If
he accepts the o¤er, then he forms the pair (a; b). In the second stage c becomes
the restricter. d is called for an o¤er and d accepts the o¤er since a and b are
deleted from the prole and so there is no better mate remained. Then, he forms
the pair (c; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed. Now, let us assume
that b rejects the o¤er in the rst stage. Then, a o¤ers to c. If c rejects the
o¤er, then d will be called and surely he will accept the o¤er which means c will
loose his chance for both of a and d. So, c accepts the o¤er and forms the pair
(a; c). In the second stage, b will be the restricter and he o¤ers to d. d will
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denitely accepts and forms the pair (b; d). And, the pair is (e; f). Now, let us
back to the beginning of the rst stage. If b accepts the o¤er from a, he forms
the pair (a; b). If he rejects as o¤er, then he forms the pair (b; d). Since, he
prefers d over a, then in the equilibrium, he rejects at the rst stage and we end
up with matching  = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g, which is the only stable matching
for R9.
Secondly, let us pick b as the restricter of the rst stage. It is easy to show
that for c rejecting bs o¤er is dominant and we end up with the same matching
.
Example 37 showed that the mechanism nds a stable matching for R9.
From Theorem 14 in section 2:3:1, this result is not unexpected. R9 has a stable
matching and our mechanism  nds it.
But, what about R8, the example by Gale and Shapley? What do we ob-
serve if we apply our mechanism to some prole that does not have any stable
matching?
Example 38 We will study R8.
R8 =
a b c d B(R)
b c a c c
c a b b b
d d d a a
d
In the rst stage, c will be the restricter. a is called to make a decision. If
a accepts the o¤er, he forms the pair (a; c). Then, the other pair will be (b; d).
If a rejects, then b will be called. Denitely b accpets the o¤er and forms (b; c).
Then, the other pair will be automatically (a; d). So, at the beginning of the
stage, if a accepts the o¤er, then he matches to c. If he rejects, then his mate
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will be d. Since he prefers c over d, a accepts the o¤er by c. Then, we end up
with matching 2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g.
We applied the mechanism  to R8 and we end up with an unstable matching.
This result is not a surprise; we knew that there is no stable matching for this
prole. The unexpected point is the behaviour of our mechanism. In section
2, we showed that  is a stable mechanism; it always nds a stable matching.
The surprise part is that as if there is stable matching for R8, the procedure is
very smooth. But, in the end it gives an ustable matching. Then, what is the
mistery for R8?
Next example will give us some clue about the perspective that we should
have to evaluate R8 or any other prole for which we do not end up with any
stable matching.
Example 39 Let N = fa; b; c; d; e; fg be the set boys with a preference prole
R10,
R10 =
a b c d e f B(R)
c c d a a b a
b d a c b a c
d a b b c c b
e e f f d d d
f f e e f e ef
In the rst stage, a will be the restricter. c is called to make a decision.
If c accepts the o¤er, he forms the pair (a; c). In the second stage b becomes
the restricter. d is called for an o¤er and d accepts the o¤er since a is deleted
from the prole and so there is no better mate remained. Then, he forms the
pair (b; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed. And, we end up with
matching i = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g.
64
Now, let us assume that c rejects the o¤er in the rst stage. Then, a o¤ers
to b. If b accepts the o¤er, he forms the pair (a; b). In the second stage c becomes
the restricter. Then, c o¤ers to d and d accepts the o¤er since a is deleted from
the prole. Then, he forms the pair (c; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically
formed. Then, we end up with matching j = f(a; b); (c; d); (e; f)g.
If b rejects the o¤er in the rst stage, then d will be called and surely he
will denitely accept the o¤er and forms the pair (a; d). In the second stage c
becomes the restricter. Then, c o¤ers to b and b denitely accepts the o¤er.
Then, he forms the pair (b; c). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed.
Then, we end up with matching k = f(a; d); (b; c); (e; f)g.
In the rst stage (after c rejects as o¤er), if b accepts as o¤er, we end up
with j. If he rejects as o¤er, we end up with k. Since kRbj, b rejects the
o¤er by a.
In the rst stage, if c accepts as o¤er, we end up with i. If c rejects as
o¤er, we end up with k. Since iRck, c accepts the o¤er by a.
Hence, we end up with matching i, which is unstable for R10.
We applied our mechanism  to R10 and we nd an unstable matching. Is
R10 one of the proles which do not have any stable matching?
The answer is "No!". R10 has absolutely and only one stable matching and
it is j .
As we have stated and proved, the mechanism  is stable.  is stronger than
, since there is only one queue and the chooser agents never experience any
conict. Then, why cannot  end up with a/the stable matching while there
exist some?
The denition below will help us to gure out the reason.
Denition 40 Let N be a set of agents. Let R be the preference prole and
B(R) is the corresponding Borda ranking. Let M  N be a proper subset of N .
65
The preference prole R^ of M is constructed by deleting the agents i 2 N=M in
R. Namely, R^ is the prole Puried from Irrelevant Alternatives (PIA)
of M and B(R^) is the corresponding Borda ranking.
In the next example, we will examine R10 with puried Borda ranking.
Example 41 R^10 =
a b c d e f B(R) B(R^)
c c d a a b a c
b d a c b a c ad
d a b b c c b b
e e f f d d d ef
f f e e f e ef
In R10, the agents e and f are the worst alternatives for the rest of the
society and for each other they are same. If we purify R10 by excluding e and f ,
we get the relationships of fa; b; c; dg with each other, as seen in prole Rfa;b;c;dg10
below,
Rfa;b;c;dg10 =
a b c d B(R^)
c c d a c
b d a c ad
d a b b b
The comparison of B(R) and B(R^) tells us that eventhough a is the most
favorite member of the set fa; b; c; dg, the support from an "irrelevant" set fe; fg
makes him the best, which falsies the result of the game. The fake position of
a makes him get a better mate which leads to an unstable matching.
If we start the game with a, then we get i = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g. On the
other hand, strating with c gives j = f(a; b); (c; d); (e; f)g and we have iRaj.
Before we nd out why the same scenario does not happen for R9, we have
a corollary to understand the story in R9.
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Corollary 42 Let M  N be an even-cardinal subset whose members form a
(top) cycle in puried Borda ranking. There is only one stable matching and in
that matching agents form pairs with their mid-rank agents.
Proof. If Card(M) = 2, then it is trivial; for both of the agents, the other is
the best for him and they form the pair.
Let Card(M) > 2. Mid-ranks give the stable matching which is easy to
check. Let i; j 2 M be two agents in pair in the stable case. Now, we shall
assume there is another stable matching where we have the pair (i; k). If we
give, wlog, k 2M to i which i prefers more than j, because of the structure of a
cycle, k gets worse o¤. If Card(M) = 4, then the other agent l 2 M forms the
pair with j, (j; l). Using the structure of a cycle, we nd that j becomes better
o¤ and l becomes worse o¤. Then, (k; l) blocks the matching. If Card(M) > 4,
we keep giving better agents to those who has become worse o¤ and we end
with a conict that there is no cycle among the members of M .
Now, we check the case for R9.
Example 43 R^9 =
a b c d e f B(R) B(R^)
b c d a a b ab abcd
c d a b b a c ef
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
For R9 with unpuried ranking, since fa; bg is the top cycle of B(R), we run
our mechanism for both of a and b and we showed that starting with either a or
b gives the same stable matching.
As we have showed in Corollary 42, there is only one stable matching for the
set fa; b; c; dg among each other. Since our mechanism  is stable, whoever we
start with, the procedure ends up with the same matching.
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Since B(R)s top cycle fa; bg is included by the one of B(R^), R9 with un-
puried Borda ranking gives coincidetanlly the stable matching. c and d would
give the same matching from the corollary.
Now, we will examine the prole R8, the example of Gale and Shapley, with
puried orderings.
Example 44 R^8 =
a b c d B(R) B(R^)
b c a c c abc
c a b b b d
d d d a a
d
Since there is a cycle between fa; b; cg, we randomly pick one of the agents
and assign him as the restricter. If we start with a, we end up with 1 =
f(a; b); (c; d)g: Starting with b gives 3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g. And, nally if c is the
restricter of the rst stage, the game reaches at 2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g. As we have
already said, none of them is stable.
From above example, the following question arises; what is the stability
condition (in terms of )?
Following proposition generalizes the example of Gale and Shapley.
Proposition 45 Let N be a society and R^ be their preference prole with puri-
ed orderings. The prole R does not have any stable matching if and only if in
the game for R^, the mechanism  confronts a cycle with odd number of agents
in a subgame.
Proof. ((=). Let M  N be a set of agents with odd number of cardinality.
From Corollary 42, we know that the agents of M match with each other. So,
one of them has to form a pair with an agent from the bottom set. The existence
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of an agent in a bottom set is guaranteed by the number of agents in the set
N . Let i 2 M be that agent and j 2 N=M be his mate. From the denition
of a cycle, it is clear that xRij where x 2 M=fig. And, again from Corollary
42, there is an agent k 2 M such that rk(i) = 1. So, the pair (k; i) blocks the
matching.
(=)). We suppose that R does not have any stable matching and there is
no cycle with odd number of agents in game of . We will show that this leads
to a contradiction.
Firstly, let us assume that there is no cycle at all. So, B(R^) is a sequence of
agents. Let (i; j) be a blocking pair. Wlog, let us assume i has a higher raking
than j does in B(R^). Since (i; j) blocks the matching, i has a mate k such
that jRik and also j has a mate l such that iRj l. This means that until js
turn, i has not been taken. Since, we have (j; l), j has not chosen any agent
until his turn for i, because better agents are not achievable for him.. Antd,
nally, when it is his turn, he does not choose i and in a later stage he chooses
l. Eventhough he has a chance, he does not choose i, which contradicts to the
rationality axiom. This contradicts to instability.
Secondly, let us assume that the game consist(s) of cycle(s) with even number
of agents. From Corollary 42, we know that agents end up one and only one
matching where they form pairs with each other in the cycle. This contradicts
to instability.
Finally, if the game is a combination of two above cases, same arguments
work.
The nal topic of this paper is multi stability. Like for the marriage problem,
in the roommate problem some proles have more than one stable matching.
The reason of multi stability is, not surprisingly, the existence of the cycles of
a set of agents for another disjoint set. Since we already did an exhaustive
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analysis of such cycles, we will not do it again in this section.
The next example is on a prole with multi stability and the outcome of the
mechainsm .
Example 46 Let N = fa; b; c; dg be any set of boys with the prole R11,
R^11 =
a b c d B(R) B(Rfa;b;cg) B(Rfa;b;dg) B(Rfb;c;dg)
c d b a a abc d b
d a a b bd a d
b c d c c b c
N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of all possible matchings, where
1 = f(a; b); (c; d)g,
2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g,
3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g.
For prole R11, the set of stable matchings is f2; 3g. As we see, there is
no one puried ordering for the whole set. So, any agent could be the restricter
of the rst stage. This is because of the cycle between the sets fa; bg and fc; dg.
It is easy to that if we start the game with a or b, we end up with matching
3. On the other hand, starting with c or d gives us matching 2.
Hence, in the existence of multi stability, we need to run all puried orderings
in order to nd all of the stable matchings of the prole.
Now, we state the most general result.
Theorem 47 Let N be a set agents and R be their preference prole. Let R^
be the puried ordering (or one of the puried orderings when multiple). The
mechanism  dened over R^, formally
 : (RN ; B(R^N ))  ! N
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gives a stable matching, when there exists some, and gives a Pareto E¢ cient
matching in the absence of stability.
Proof. The stability part has been proved by the examples, corollaries, claims
and propositions so far.
Pareto e¢ ciency is proved from the denition of a cycle with odd number of
agents. There always exists an agent who matches to his most favorite choice.
Increasing the "payo¤s" of the blocking pair damages to this agent. Hence, the
matching from the procedure is Pareto e¢ cient.
4.4 The Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a simple mechanism to the roommate problem.
The mechanism is a renement of the mechanism by Evci (2014). While applying
their mechanism to this problem, we have benetted from the Borda rule in a
scial welfare function form. Then, we analyze the e¤ect of this SWF in two
scenarios by simply seperating the raw and puried orderings.
First of all, as we have showed, the mechanism  is quite successful under the
puried orderings in determining the stability of any given prole. The success
of  for the raw orderings depends on whether it coincide with the puried
orderings or not. As long as the top set of the raw orderings concide with those
of puried orderings, we end up with a/the stable matchings.
We have showed that in the absence of stability, the mechanism  ends up
with a Pareto e¢ cient matching.
And nally, we showed that  is also an easy and strong mechanism to nd
all the stable matchings for a given prole in the existence of multiple case.
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